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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
TRIAL BY JURY IN WARTIME
By
CHARLES ALVIN JONES
Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Trial by jury is of such ancient origin and has so long endured that, all too
frequently, its permanence as an institution for the trial of alleged offenses against
society or the Government seems to be taken for granted. Does not our Federal
Constitution provide that "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury; * * *" (Art. III, Sec. 2)? And, does not our State Con-
stitution guarantee that "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate" (Art. I, Sec. 6)? Yet, the right to trial by jury has at times
been threatened and, particularly, in times of war. Strange as it may seem, such
affronts have been no less evident when the war was being waged for the preserva-
tion of our free institutions which are designed to secure and maintain the liberties
of the people. Our country's history furnishes a number of such instances, one
of which is of especial interest and importance.
During the Civil War, one Milligan, a citizen of the United States and a
resident of the State of Indiana for twenty years, was accused of activities which,
if true, evidenced his disloyalty to the Union in a culpable manner. He was
arrested at his home on October 5, 1864, upon orders of the Commanding Gen-
eral of the District of Indiana and was confined in a military prison in In-
dianapolis. On October 21st following, he was placed on trial before a military
commission, convened in Indianapolis on orders of the Commanding General,
upon charges preferred by the Judge Advocate of the Northwestern Military
Department. The charges embraced (1) conspiracy against the Government of
the United States, (2) affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority
of the United States, (3) inciting insurrection, (4) disloyal practices, and (5)
violation of the laws of war. The charges were supported by specifications
which need not now be detailed. No question of their sufficiency was involved.
Milligan had never been a member of the military or naval forces of the United
States; nor a resident of a State in rebellion to Federal authority; nor a belligerent.
He was convicted by the military commission on all charges and was sentenced
to be hanged. The Sentence received Executive approval in May of 1865, and
was ordered to be carried out on the 19th of that month. On May 10th Milligan
had filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the military commission was
without jurisdiction to try him and that the conviction and sentence were there-
fore void.
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The judges of the Circuit Court, being evenly divided in opinion on the
issues involved, certified to the Supreme Court of the United States three ques-
tions all of which were unanimously answered by that Court in favor of the
petitioner's contentions. The Court did divide (five to four) on a question not
raised by the facts of the case with respect to the power of the President or
Congress to institute such a military commission in an actual theatre of war where
the civil courts were not open for the administration of justice. But, as already
stated, there- was unanimity that the President was without authority to invest a
military commission in a State not invaded, not engaged in rebellion and in
which the Federal Courts were open, with jurisdiction to try, convict or sentence
for a criminal offense a citizen who was neither a resident of a rebel State, nor
a prisoner of war, nor in the military or naval forces of the country.
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to enter upon a review of the pro-
cedural questions' also considered and passed upon by the Supreme Court in
Milligan's case. Our immediate concern is as to the right of a non-military and
non-belligerent offender in a locality other than an actual theatre of war, where
the courts continue to function as usual, to trail by jury.
With respect to that question Mr. Justice Davis, who wrote the majority
opinion in the Milligan case, said that "The Constitution of the United States
is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circum-
stances"; that a " * * guarantee of freedom was broken when Milligan was
denied a trial by jury"; that "* * * until recently no one ever doubted that the
right of trial by jury was fortified in the organic law against the power of attack";
and that "this right (of trial by jury) - one of the most valuable in a free coun-
try - is preserved to everyone accused of crime who is not attached to the army,
or navy, or militia in actual service." The learned Justice then added, -
"It follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are
occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign
invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is im-
possible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on
the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails,
there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority,
thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society;
and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern
by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As neces-
sity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; and, if this (mili-
tary) government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it
1The other questions were (1) whether, in the circumstances shown, habeas corpus was avail-
able to the petitioner under the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1863, (1 Stat. at Large 81),
the privilege of the writ having theretofore been suspended by Executive order, (2) whether a peti-
tion for habeas corpus amounted to the institution of a cause, the allowance or refusal of process
wherein raised a reviewable question of law, and (3) whether questions of law could be certified
to the Supreme Court for answer upon a record such as was then before the Court.
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is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where
the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise
of their jurisdiction."
Apart from operating to discharge Milligan from the custody of the military
authorities, the decision immediately provoked from a large segment of the
Northern press criticisms of the Supreme Court and certain of its members in
particular which were both abusive and denunciatory. Appomattox was then
but a few months in the past and the hatreds and passions engendred by the late
war were still bitter and intense. But is was not long before the decision came
to be recognized generally for what it was and is, - "one of the bulwarks of
American liberty": see Warren, The Supreme Court of United States History,
Vol. 2, p. 427 et seq.
However, in the case of the German saboteurs who landed clandestinely
from enemy submarines on the Atlantic coast in June 1942 and who were tried
and convicted by a military commission, the Attorney General urged upon the
Supreme Court a limitation or restriction of the doctrine of the Milligan case to
the end that a wider discretion might be accorded the Executive in the matter
of the detention and trial of "persons suspected of hostile associations" in war-
time: see Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1. But, no such relaxation was appropriate
to the circumstances even if it could ever be considered justifiable. The saboteurs
were belligerents in the pay and under the orders of an enemy government.
2
They had entered our country in military uniform of the enemy and, upon land-
ing, had immediately discarded such clothing for civilian dress, the better to
conceal their identity for their hostile purposes. They carried with them ex-
plosives, fuses and incendiary and timing devices for their intended use in de-
stroying munitions plants and military establishments in this country which they
were under orders from the German High Command to do. Chief Justice
Stone, speaking for the Supreme Court, after pointing out (p. 45) the distinction
between the Milligan case and the saboteurs' case, held (p. 46), "* * * that those
particular acts [committed by the saboteurs] constitute an offense against the law
of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission."
Incidentally, Chief Justice Stone took occasion to reiterate a dictum of Chief
Justice Chase in his separate opinion in the Milligan case by saying (p. 25)
that "Constitutional safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with
offenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on some
who are guilty."
2Only the petitioner Haupt claimed United States citizenship on the basis of his parents'
naturalization during Haupt's minority. Born in Germany, he had been brought to this country
at the age of five by his parents, but, upon attaining his majority, he returned to Germany and
thereafter showed his allegiance to that country. In view of the offenses charged and proven
against the saboteurs (violations of the law of war), the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
resolve Haupt's claim to citizenship.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Where, however, a resident, not attached to this country's military or naval
forces and not a belligerent or a prisoner of war, is charged with an offense in
a State not embraced in an actual theatre of war and where the courts are open
for the proper and unhampered exercise of their judicial functions, the rule of
the Milligan case stands unimpaired and secures to such offender his constitu-
tional right to a trial by jury: see Duncan v. Kahanamoku, - U. S. - (decided
February 25, 1946), and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy on the
present day vigor of the Milligan case. A year following the Supreme Court's
decision in Ex Parte Quirin, supra, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in an able opinion by Judge Ganey, held that
the Philadelphia area was not in an actual theatre of war and, in reliance upon
the rule in the Milligan case, thereupon invalidated an expulsion order arbitrarily
entered by the Military Commander of the District against a German-born
naturalized citizen of the United States without open charge or judicial hearing:
see Olga Schueller v. Drum, Lieutenant General, 51 Fed. Supp. 383.
Although there is language in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81,
93, from which it might be inferred that the Executive has an almost absolute
right in wartime to determine the immediacy and pendency of the danger from
without which justifies martial rule and the suspension of civil rights, yet the
allowable limits of military discretion in such regard and whether or not they
have been overstepped in a particular case still remain judicial questions where
courts are open and functioning: Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 401.3
So long as that is so, the "open court" criterion for determining the nonpresence
of "an actual theatre of war" will properly endure. And, if we faithfully follow
the teaching of the Milligan case, martial rule will never be permitted to exist
where the courts are open and in the proper. and unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdiction.
$in the case of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, the Supreme Court by a six to
three vote sustained a conviction in a Federal Court of California of a native.born American citizen
of Japanese ancestry for his failure to obey an order of the Military Commander of the District that
he evacuate his home and enter an Assembly Center, - "a euphemism for a: prison" as Mr. Justice
Roberts pointed out, in his dissent, on the basis of the Commanding General's report to the Sec-
retary of War. Why the reasonableness of the order did not raise a judicial question in the at-
tending circumstances (cf. Sterling v. Constantin, supra; also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, supra) does
not appear. And, it is more than difficult to understand how the disobeyed order could have been
thought to be other than a flagrant violation of the petitioner's rights. It would seem that the
sound constitutional view was the one taken by the three separate dissenters.
